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Using Latour’s concepts of “actor-network” and “translation,” the
authors show that neoliberalism’s success in Eastern Europe is best
analyzed not as an institutional form diffused along the nodes of a
network, but as itself an actor-network based on a particular trans-
lation strategy that construes socialism as a laboratory of economic
knowledge. They argue that socialism was made into a laboratory
of economic knowledge during the socialist calculation debate of the
1920s and 1930s. An extensive debate during the Cold War is also
documented and shows that a transnational network continued to
be organized around attempts to connect the results obtained in the
socialist laboratory with debates and struggles in Western econom-
ics. Finally, the drafting of transition blueprints in postcommunist
Eastern Europe after 1989, with the participation of American econ-
omists, is shown to be a continuation of this transnational network.
After communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989, the new
postcommunist governments have embarked, at various speeds, on neo-
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Scholars. We would like to thank these institutions for their generous support. We
would also like to thank the Ford Foundation and the Library of Congress for access
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and criticisms, and generously shared their knowledge and views with us. We would
like to thank Michael Bernstein, David Engerman, Peter Evans, Neil Fligstein, Sheila
Jasanoff and the participants in her Science Studies Research Seminar, Martha Lamp-
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liberal economic reforms designed to bring about rapid liberalization,
macroeconomic restructuring, and, ultimately, privatization. Ever since,
much has been written about the transition from communism to capitalism
in Eastern Europe, with critics and adherents battling over the soundness
of logic, as well as purported effects of neoliberal reforms. In this article,
however, we would like to pose a different question about the reforms:
What explains the fact that neoliberal ideas and policy recommendations
have been adopted so rapidly, and almost unanimously, in post-1989 East-
ern Europe?
Our answer will be that the roots of this rapid and strong embrace of
neoliberalism reside in a transnational network composed of both Amer-
ican and East European economists. Within this network, we argue, a
transnational dialogue was conducted, as early as the years of the Cold
War, during the course of which neoliberal ideas were worked out and
disseminated. Its existence helps explain why East European reformers,
many of whom participated in this dialogue, not only perceived the need
for neoliberal reforms, but also became some of the strongest global cham-
pions of such reforms.
What is surprising or counterintuitive about this answer? It runs con-
trary to the almost unanimous accord of scholars who believe that East
European reformers were novices in market economics, at best “learning
by doing,” and needed to undergo a crash course under the tutelage of
Western advisors. The view is, therefore, that these advisors exported
Western neoliberalism to Eastern Europe and imposed it there with the
support of Western governments and international economic agencies
(Grosfeld 1992, pp. 62–63; King 2001, pp. 2–3; Kovacs 1991, 1992; Murrell
1995, pp. 166–67; Reich 1991, p. 220; Wedel 2001). In this article, however,
we will show that East European reformers were converted into adherents
of neoliberalism long before 1989 by participating in transnational dia-
logue and through jurisdiction battles over the role of economists under
socialism. More important, we will argue that it is impossible to divide
this transnational dialogue into an active, Western “author” of neoliberal
ideas and policies and a passive, East European “recipient.” Neoliberalism
was not simply disseminated from West to East, but was made possible
and constructed through the dialogue and exchanges that took place
within this transnational network.
This argument runs contrary not only to extant explanations of the
transition to capitalism in Eastern Europe, but also to what has been
argued about the adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies in
other parts of the globe, notably Latin America. Sociologists and political
as the AJS reviewers. Direct correspondence to Gil Eyal, Department of Sociology,
Columbia University, 1180 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, New York 10027.
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scientists have argued that the global success of neoliberalism was evi-
dence for the dominance of Western and in particular U.S. economics,
and that local policy makers adopted it in order to gain legitimacy vis-
à-vis international financial institutions (Babb 2001; Centeno 2001; Mar-
koff and Montecinos 1993). While it is clear that Latin America, the
traditional “backyard” of the United States, is an altogether different case
from postcommunist Eastern Europe, we think that there are also some
more general theoretical reasons why our accounts differ.
Clearly, the question about the adoption of neoliberalism is a subspecies
of a more general theoretical question about the causes of isomorphism
in organizational fields (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). New institutionalist
arguments, particularly those about “coercive” and “normative” isomor-
phism, have played an important role in explaining the widespread adop-
tion of neoliberal policies and in resisting economistic explanations ac-
cording to which states were adopting neoliberalism as the most rational
and technically efficient response to a changing competitive environment
(Babb 2001; Centeno 2001; Markoff and Montecinos 1993; Fourcade-
Gourinchas 2000; Meyer et al. 1997). The considerations we present here,
therefore, should not be taken as refutation of new institutionalist think-
ing, but as a contribution to it. We think that our focus on transnational
ties and transnational dialogue helps to specify how global networks ac-
tually work in processes of institutional diffusion and what role local
actors play in these exchanges.
We see transnational networks and transnational dialogue where others
have seen merely imitation and imposition because of the attention we
pay to the issue of reproduction. Isomorphism has customarily been
treated as a sequence starting with innovation and ending with adoption
and diffusion. Reproduction, however, should be isolated as a distinct
analytical phase within this sequence. Simply put, for innovations to be
imitated and diffused they must remain the “same thing” through these
processes, that is, there must be some mechanism that keeps them together
and protects and replicates them. For example, if neoliberalism is becom-
ing global through processes of institutional isomorphism, what guar-
antees that the same set of policy recommendations is copied the world
over and is not tinkered with and changed? Of course, if neoliberalism
is a “theory,” a set of logically consistent propositions as its adherents
maintain, then it is easy to justify why it remains “the same” through
diffusion—because it is “correct.” But this is precisely the sort of rationalist
fallacy against which new institutionalists warned. If neoliberalism, on
the other hand, is a set of policy recommendations unified as an institution,
the explanation of its reproduction is trickier. The answer given by in-
stitutionalists is that the process of institutionalization turns this set of
rules into taken-for-granted: They are taken as “fact,” and protected from
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scrutiny by force of habit or by avoidance of the cognitive effort required
to question them (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 15; Meyer and Rowan
1991, p. 44; Zucker 1991, pp. 85–88). This argument, however, is in tension
with the stated preference of new institutionalists to treat actors as re-
flexive and knowledgeable (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, pp. 22–27), hence
to treat taken-for-grantedness itself as provisional and revisable. Put dif-
ferently, taken-for-grantedness is no answer at all for how institutional
forms are reproduced; it merely signals the problem. As Jepperson puts
it, the question is what kind of taken-for-grantedness is involved, and
what are the conditions and mechanisms that either protect it from chal-
lenge, or render it vulnerable (Jepperson 1991, pp. 145–47, 152)? New
institutionalists did not deal adequately with this problem. They either
ignored it, in effect implying that reproduction was assured by the same
external factors that facilitated the diffusion of institutional forms—fear
of uncertainty, coercion, or the interests of experts (Powell and DiMaggio
1991, pp. 67–74; Babb 2001, pp. 16–21; Centeno 2001)—or they suggested
that taken-for-grantedness was protected by decoupling formal institu-
tional structure from an informal, and more reflexive, level of functioning
(Meyer and Rowan 1991, pp. 57–58). As Guillen has noted with respect
to Meyer’s argument about the emergence of a global world society, this
means that institutionalist analysis is couched at a very high level of
abstraction (2001, p. 246). Isomorphism is demonstrated, but it is fairly
empty, composed only of “myth and ceremony,” while more concrete mech-
anisms are obscured (for a similar critique see Tilly [1999, pp. 407–9]).
It is not generally recognized that both Foucault and Latour have
grappled with precisely this same set of issues and attempted to provide
conceptual tools—respectively, “discursive relations” and “actor-net-
work”—with which to approach it.
With the concept of “discourse,” Foucault sought to avoid the same
rationalist fallacy identified by new institutionalist sociologists (i.e., that
theories or ideas are adopted because they are somehow “correct” and
“true” (Foucault 1972, pp. 21–55, 79–105). His contribution was to re-
formulate the problem as one of reproduction: how to explain, without
recourse to some knowledge of what the “truth” should be, that certain
discursive “events” were replicated, while others disappeared. The answer,
Foucault argued, was that discursive practice established a definite set of
relations between discursive events, which worked to preserve them. Such
relations carry a certain necessity, but not because they are taken for
granted, not because actors do not think about them, but because they
think with them, because they govern how the objects of discourse are
formed or what modes of observation and formulation are available.
Latour (1987, 1993) continued this insight, but he gave it a more con-
crete and sociologically satisfactory form. He suggested thinking of any
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scientific artifact (a law, a discovery, an invention, a theory, a demon-
stration) as an “actor-network”; that is, as a network composed of a set
of ties and alliances between human and nonhuman agents. He thus
introduced agency into discourse by depicting it as an activity of con-
structing and weaving together a network of discursive relations. From
this point of view, an explanation for the persistence and reproduction of
institutional forms need not refer to external forces, nor must it be satisfied
with a vague notion of taken-for-grantedness. Instead, the explanation
can focus on the actual work of constructing a network and of establishing
ties between statements, instrumentation, effects demonstrated in the lab,
financial resources, the opinion and support of colleagues, and other such
components. If a certain institutional form is reproduced and dissemi-
nated, this is in direct proportion to the amount of resources mobilized
through network ties, to the strength of the ties forged, and to the capacity
of interested actors to close them in a “black box”; that is, to hide
the work needed to connect together the different elements of the actor-
network (Latour 1987, pp. 2, 131). If a certain institutional form fails to
be reproduced and disseminated, it is because other actors were capable
of opening the black box, then untying the network and pillaging its
components for their own use. Latour (1987) explicitly opposes his own
approach to the idea that innovations are “diffused” (pp. 132–41). Since
institutional forms or scientific artifacts are networks of relations, what
may seem as diffusion might be better construed as a lengthening of the
network in order to mobilize crucial new resources needed to reproduce
it or to protect it from attacks. By the same token, what new institution-
alists depicted as imitative of given institutional forms should be under-
stood as “translation”—meaning the ability of network builders to devise
an interpretation that aligns their interests with the network’s new re-
cruits, whose support and resources are crucial for its survival (Latour
1987, p. 108).
This article seeks to demonstrate the usefulness of this approach in
explaining the rapid success of neoliberalism in postcommunist Eastern
Europe. In the first section, we begin our discussion of the origins of
neoliberalism by going back to the debate about socialist economic cal-
culation in the 1920s and 1930s. This debate was conducted between
Austrian economists on the one hand, who argued that economic calcu-
lation was impossible under socialism, and neoclassical mathematical
economists of a socialist bent on the other, who sought to show that
socialist economic arrangements permitted calculation and were efficient.
We do not think that this debate already contained neoliberal thinking
in embryo, as the proverbial acorn from which the tree was to grow. But
we try to show that it constituted an important discursive event, setting
up socialism as a laboratory of economic knowledge. From a Latourian
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point of view, however, the essential question is how this discursive event
was made replicable; that is to say how the results obtained in the socialist
“laboratory” could be mobilized to support arguments about market re-
lations. We show that each side in the debate developed a different trans-
lation strategy to align the interests of economists studying socialism with
those who study capitalism: neoclassical mathematical economists mini-
mized the institutional differences between socialism and capitalism and
postulated formal equivalence between problems of mathematical plan-
ning; Austrian economists depicted the socialist laboratory as magnifying
into systemic distortions what under “normal” market relations were small
deviations, thus permitting a better appreciation of their significance.
This approach explains our focus on transnational dialogue and trans-
national networks, because in the years following the debate, if the dis-
cursive event was to be replicated, these translation strategies had to be
used in order to construct transnational networks, which could mobilize
the research done on socialism and connect it with Western economics.
There is a burgeoning literature on the role played by networks and
“epistemic communities” in global diffusion of institutional models (Adler
and Hass 1992; Evangelista 1999; Haas 1990, 1992; Hall 1993; Keck and
Sikkink 1998), but the reader can now appreciate in what way our La-
tourian approach is different. We emphasize that institutions themselves
are actor-networks. Thus, institutional models are not simply passed
along, copied and imitated via transnational networks, but are put to-
gether and reproduced through them. This is the chief reason why our
account of the success of neoliberalism differs from other arguments using
the framework of institutional isomorphism. In the second section of the
article, we demonstrate the existence of two East-West discussions and
two transnational networks of economists in the 1950s and 1960s. The
first network was composed of mainstream mathematical economists
speaking the common language of linear programming. The second net-
work was composed of American libertarian economists, who at the time
were a distinct minority battling against the reigning Keynesian ortho-
doxy, together with a no less embattled group of East European econo-
mists, who were becoming highly critical of political obstacles to economic
reform under socialism. We show that both networks did not involve
simply the diffusion and imitation of institutional models (in this case,
economic theories and methodologies), but each was built around a par-
ticular translation strategy to connect the results obtained in the socialist
laboratory to arguments about market economics. The linear pro-
grammers sought to demonstrate, under socialist conditions, that math-
ematical modeling of resource allocation could produce results superior
to markets or at least as efficient as markets. The Austrian translation
strategy meant that participants interpreted their exchanges as demon-
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strating that socialist institutional arrangements created systematic dis-
tortions of underlying market processes, analogous to the perverse effects
of Keynesianism.
Moreover, we argue that the fact that this transnational dialogue was
forgotten, and that later observers simply saw the diffusion of neoliber-
alism from West to East, is not accidental but a systematic feature of the
way the actor-network was constructed. With very few exceptions, Amer-
ican economists tended to represent their socialist interlocutors as ignorant
of Western economic theory. This meant that they could “black box” the
discourse of their interlocutors and present it as simply “data,” a report
on the facts. Put differently, the very translation and alignment of interests
facilitating the construction of the network also obscured how it worked:
since socialism was to be a laboratory of economic knowledge, American
economists could not see the contributions of their East European col-
leagues as anything but a report on “reality.” Eastern European econo-
mists, for their part, were content with this translation. They were engaged
in a struggle against bureaucrats and party officials for professional ju-
risdiction over the economy, and they made use of the prestige of their
Western colleagues, as well as the resources that the latter commanded,
in order to support their claim. Thus, as Latour (1987) would suggest,
the fact that the transnational dialogue was forgotten was a function of
the capacity of network builders to position themselves at an “obligatory
point of passage” within the network (pp. 150, 245). From this point
Western economists controlled the flow of key resources to other nodes
of the network; by the same token they also mobilized and appropriated
the work performed there.2
It follows, therefore, that if libertarian economists wanted to challenge
their Keynesian opponents, they had to obtain a foothold in the socialist
laboratory so that they could open up and rearrange the black boxes of
“facts” produced there. It was crucial that they too would recruit East
European economists as allies, in particular those who were critical of
socialism. In the third and final section of the article we seek to show
that the rapid adoption of neoliberalism in Eastern Europe, which was
2 It should be clear, therefore, how our argument differs from other critiques of the
idea that globalization leads to homogenization and Americanization (Appadurai 1996;
Nederveen Pieterse 1992). As Wimmer (2001, p. 438) has noted, most of the arguments
about hybridization and creolization do not break with the view of a single, overarching
principle of global isomorphism. They merely shift the valence to peripheral practices
of resistance, which they depict as subverting globalization. Our version of “hybridity,”
however, is different and closely follows Latour (1993, pp. 41–43): the idea of a single
logic of globalization-cum-Americanization is a myth perpetuated by the pattern of
forgetting and appropriation characteristic of transnational actor-networks. The hybrid
is not what resists globalization, but the very way it works. On the concept of juris-
dictional struggles, see Abbott (1988).
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perceived as a paradigmatic case of diffusion and imitation, is better
grasped as another case of translation and alignment of interests. We
show that neoliberal transition policies, especially the notorious recom-
mendation of “shock therapy,” were not simply the dictate of Western
advisors, but reflected the experience and interests of a specific group of
East European economists. These economists were engaged in an on-
going jurisdictional battle over the reform of socialist economies that had
begun as early as the late 1960s. In the course of these struggles they
opened up the “black boxes” constructed by their opponents and devised
an opposing representation of socialist economies as chaotic, inefficient,
and in need of radical shock therapy. It was this vision that they offered
in the transition period, as “the facts,” to their Western interlocutors,
promising the ultimate laboratory experiment to vindicate neoliberalism.
THE DEBATE ABOUT SOCIALIST ECONOMIC CALCULATION
The socialist calculation debate began in 1920 with the publication of an
essay by the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises ([1920] 1935), which
argued that socialist economic arrangements precluded the possibility of
rational economic calculation and thus could not allocate goods as effi-
ciently as markets. The debate continued in a variety of venues at least
until 1940. It is customary to distinguish two stages in the debate (Lavoie
1985b): in the first, conducted mainly between von Mises and Marxist
economists, the major issue in dispute was whether the labor theory of
value could serve as an adequate basis for economic calculation; in the
second, prompted by the “economic theory of socialism” proposed by the
Polish economist Oskar Lange (1938), the debate was conducted between
neoclassical economists sympathetic to socialism and the Austrian econ-
omist Friedrich von Hayek; here, the major issue was whether central
planning could achieve rational pricing (Hayek 1939). While the first stage
of the debate could be seen as one of the ideological battles in the war
between Marxists and liberals, the second stage involved a struggle in-
ternal to neoclassical economics and concerned not only ideology, but also
the control of the profession. We will focus, therefore, on the second stage
of the debate, though a full sociological analysis of this debate is beyond
the reach of this article. Rather, we will merely try to show how Lange’s
theory and Hayek’s response collaborated in producing a discursive
event—establishing socialism as a laboratory for economic knowl-
edge—which the two adversaries put to different uses by relying on two
different translation strategies.
In what sense was the socialist calculation debate part of a professional
struggle within neoclassical economics? As Yonay (1998) has shown, the
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interwar years in the United States were a time of heightened struggle
over control of the economics profession. Initially this struggle was be-
tween neoclassical and institutionalist economists; later, those factions
were challenged and eventually defeated by a new and younger group of
neoclassical mathematical economists (pp. 77–99, 184–95). Oskar Lange,
studying in the United States in the 1930s, belonged to this latter group,
as did other economists who later wrote about socialism. Thus, we suggest
that when these individuals proposed to show that socialist economic
planning could achieve efficiency and rational pricing they were not
merely defending socialism, they were also recruiting allies into the emerg-
ing network organized around the new mathematical techniques. Simi-
larly, the other side in the debate, Austrian economists, did not engage
in the debate simply because they were antisocialist from the start. In
fact, it was only in the course of the debate about socialist economic
calculation that the Austrian “school,” which previously was understood
to be a more or less stylistic difference within the larger marginalist rev-
olution, came to be sharply differentiated. It acquired its distinctive char-
acter by challenging the relevance of the new mathematical techniques
(Boetkke 2000, pp. 6–7; Lavoie 1985b, pp. 3–4; Shearmur 1996, pp. 33–35,
40–41).
Mathematical economists based their work on general equilibrium the-
ory, which the Swiss economist Leon Walras had developed. As Yonay
(1998) argues, the victory of this group in later years cannot be ascribed
simply to the greater usefulness or validity of mathematical techniques
(pp. 184–95). General equilibrium models required highly restrictive and
simplifying assumptions of perfect competition and perfect knowledge,
and thus were vulnerable to charges that they were not realistic.3 Econ-
omists typically used these models to show that the system of equations,
which described the preferences of all consumers and the production func-
tions of all commodities, was solvable in principle, but it could not be
used to find actual preferences and production functions. Moreover, to
simulate the workings of markets, they employed the highly stylized fiction
of an auctioneer announcing prices and taking bids. It was for these
reasons that research on socialism held special importance for mathe-
matical economists. The fiction of the auctioneer could be represented by
a concrete institution, the central planning authority of the socialist state;
the system of equations no longer described a simulation divorced from
actual values, but could be seen as the very means by which actual ec-
onomic activity is directed. The simplifying assumptions necessary for the
3 This very same charge was directed by the institutionalists, with some success, against
the deductive approach employed by the earlier generation of neoclassical theorists
like Knight and Viner (Yonay 1998, pp. 80–94).
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model could then be translated into directives issued by the central plan-
ning authority. Lange (1938) suggested that market socialism would work
in the following way: first, the central planning authority drafts clear and
binding rules, which include the instruction for managers to approximate
in their pricing the marginal cost of production (pp. 72–98). These rules
are published, so all economic actors are familiar with them. At the second
stage, production and competition begin on the basis of these rules and
prices. The third stage is iterative, as the central planning authority con-
tinuously adjusts the rules and prices in accordance with the feedback it
gets from the managers. Eventually, efficiency and equilibrium are
reached. In many respects, Lange’s “socialism” was simply a general equi-
librium model put into practice. This is why he argued that it could be
mathematically demonstrated that a socialism thus organized would
achieve market-clearing prices and equilibrium more efficiently than free
competition.
We can see, therefore, what kind of discursive event took place through
Lange’s intervention in the debate: socialism was given a privileged status
as a laboratory of economic knowledge, wherein results could be obtained
that were not possible under capitalism and which also bolstered the
legitimacy of the new mathematical techniques. In order to make the
results obtained in the socialist laboratory count in debates between West-
ern economists, however, Lange’s proposal included a specific “translation
strategy” that was designed to align his own interests with those of math-
ematical economists more generally. The general features of this strategy
are evident in Lange’s model, which constructs a relation of formal equiv-
alence between the socialist laboratory and capitalist market relations:
1. As against the Marxist economists, Lange agreed with von Mises
and his followers that the essential nature of the economic problem
under capitalism and socialism was identical. In both cases, the ques-
tion was how to optimally allocate scarce resources to achieve desired
ends (Lange 1938, pp. 98–99; Hayek 1935, pp. 4–7);
2. Lange also maintained that the institutional differences between so-
cialism and capitalism did not modify the essential nature of the
technique required to solve this problem, namely some form of “pro-
gramming,” which iteratively calculates marginal costs of production
and corrects them on the basis of continuous feedback until a point
of equilibrium is achieved. General equilibrium models represented
such technique. “The formal analogy . . . between the principles of
distribution of resources in a socialist and in a competitive regime
of private enterprise makes the scientific technique of the theory of
economic equilibrium which has been worked out for the latter also
applicable to the former” (Lange 1938, pp. 107–8);
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3. Finally, while the technique was the same, Lange (1938) argued that
socialism allowed one to apply it without the institutional limitations
it faced under capitalism (pp. 101–5). The institution of private prop-
erty limited the application of the technique because it did not permit
independent iterations needed to determine the most rational allo-
cation of resources and because it left out a variety of factors as
“externalities,” which were not taken into account in the calculation
of prices.
While Lange obviously meant these arguments to make “the economist’s
case for socialism,” they could also function in the opposite way—as a
translation strategy that permitted one to use socialism as a laboratory
for the new mathematical techniques (Lange 1938, p. 98). As we shall
demonstrate in the next section, this is how most later mathematical
economists perceived the significance of their contacts with East European
economists and their joint work on market reforms under socialism (Arrow
and Hurwicz 1960, pp. 34–43, 76–81).
Similarly, it is possible to see Hayek’s intervention in the debate and
his response to Lange as partaking of the same discursive event but using
a different translation strategy in order to connect it with a different
version of neoclassical economics. As Shearmur (1996, p. 48) notes, up
until 1937 Hayek’s thought was dominated by general equilibrium theory,
and thus the Austrian “school” seemed to merge with other strands of
neoclassical economics. When Hayek moved to Britain and won a pres-
tigious chair at the London School of Economics, he found himself shut
out of the more influential discussions of economic policy in the circle
around Keynes (Yonay 1998, p. 47). In his response to Lange, however,
only three years later, Hayek formulated a discursive strategy that not
only positioned him as the champion of the free market against Keynes-
ianism but also endowed the Austrian school with a distinctive character
and challenged the relevance of general equilibrium theory and associated
mathematical techniques.4 Hayek attacked directly the core idea of equi-
librium, without which mathematical modeling would be pointless. He
argued that markets worked not because they reached equilibrium, but
precisely because they never did (since the point of equilibrium is also a
point of zero profits and least motivation). Consequently, “it becomes
exceedingly difficult to say what are exactly the assumptions on the basis
of which we assert that there will be a tendency towards equilibrium and
4 While Keynes was not particularly partial to mathematical economics, already by
1937 Hicks translated Keynes’s general theory into an influential mathematical version,
which became the basis for the postwar dominant coalition composed of mathematical
modelers, Keynesians, and econometricians (Yonay 1998, pp. 190–95). Hayek was
probably responding to this synthesis.
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to claim that our analysis has an application to the real world” (Hayek
1948, p. 48). The advantage of markets lay rather in the fact that they
provided dispersed, accurate, real-time information, coupled with pre-
cisely calculated incentives, in a way that allowed economic actors to
“coordinate” their decisions and actions. The fiction of the Walrasian
auctioneer was thus a distorted representation of the economic process;
consequently its equation with the position of a central planning office
was illegitimate. Neither could the central planning office know all that
is needed in order to adjust prices accurately, nor could it calculate and
communicate the new prices in real time to economic actors. Hayek thus
challenged the relevance of the Walrasian representation of equilibrium
to the understanding of market processes and sought to push mathe-
matical technique back to the status of a fictitious model of limited heu-
ristic value.
Socialism was thus, for Hayek too, a privileged laboratory for economic
knowledge. While one could apply general equilibrium theory to capitalist
market relations and argue that it served as a good enough approximation,
in the socialist laboratory it was possible to open up the black box and
untie the chain of assumptions underlying the model. In particular, the
attempt to “program” economic relations highlighted their character as
information relations and raised the problem of how economic actions
are to be coordinated in real time and under conditions of limited infor-
mation. As Hayek himself testified, this new conception of markets was
not simply a matter of self-clarification, making explicit what was already
implicit in the Austrian tradition, but a result of the debate about socialist
economic calculation, made possible by the socialist laboratory experi-
ment:
It was only when, because the economic system did not accomplish all we
wanted, we prevented it from doing what it had been accomplishing, in an
attempt to make it obey us in an arbitrary way, that we realized that there
was anything to be understood. It was only incidentally, as a by product
of the study of such isolated phenomena, that it was gradually realized that
many things which had been taken for granted were, in fact, the product
of a highly complicated organism which we could only hope to understand
by the intense mental effort of systematic inquiry. (Quoted in Shearmur
1996, pp. 36–37)
It is important to recognize how precarious Hayek’s new conception
of markets and coordination was and how completely it depended on the
socialist laboratory to demonstrate its advantage over competing versions
of neoclassical economics. Hayek criticized general equilibrium theory and
mathematical modeling for their lack of realism, but without the com-
parison to socialism his own approach did not seem any more realistic.
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Unlike equilibrium, for example, coordination was not a mathematically
formalizable property of markets, but neither was it an empirically ob-
servable property. Hayek, who called for economic theory to pay attention
to how markets “actually worked,” could not himself explain how to
observe such workings, nor could he prove that coordination was pro-
duced by the mechanisms he claimed were producing it—private property,
price signals, and profit and loss calculations (Shearmur 1996, pp. 50–52).
Moreover, he was loath to recommend concrete empirical investigation
of institutions because Austrian economics was formed by championing
theoretical analysis as against the German historical school (Yonay 1998,
p. 39). This is why the socialist laboratory was of such crucial importance
for the coherence of the Austrian school, equipped, however, with a dif-
ferent translation strategy than the one deployed by mathematical econ-
omists. This translation strategy was formulated beautifully, many years
later, by a Czech economist: “[Socialist] countries represent a sort of lab-
oratory, unique for economists, not too different from a high-energy lab-
oratory used by physicists, where phenomena which are manifest under
normal conditions as tiny deviations, achieve large magnitudes; it is then
easier to study the laws of their development” (Zieleniec 1990, p. 8).
This translation strategy did not construct a relation of formal equiv-
alence between the socialist laboratory and capitalist market relations,
but an almost opposite relation. If, for the Walrasian, formal equivalence
lay in the fact that markets were nothing but a collection of programming
problems, for the Austrians the possibility of translation lay in the fact
that central planning was nothing but submerged, distorted, and subor-
dinated markets—that is, the inescapable relations of information. The
study of socialism thus served as a laboratory experiment meant to de-
termine “how far one can go in introducing command elements into a
market economy” (Friedman 1981, p. 3), that is, to translate socialist
economic phenomena into large-scale distortions of markets corresponding
to the “tiny deviations”—principal-agent problems, monopolies, supply
constraints, imperfect prices, shortages, inflation—supposedly introduced
by Keynesian state intervention. Using this translation strategy, Austrian
economists could mobilize the results obtained in the socialist laboratory
to criticize the institutional design of Western capitalism and to highlight
by contrast the capacity of markets to provide accurate in-time infor-
mation and to effectively coordinate individual action (Hayek 1939, pp.
9–10).
A reader well versed in neoliberal economics can recognize here a point
common to many later strands of economic analysis: public choice theory,
monetarism, information economics, property rights theory, and, in gen-
eral, the contemporary obsession with “governance.” It was not our in-
tention, however, to argue that neoliberalism sprung from Hayek’s head,
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fully formed and clad in shining armor. Our argument is that the socialist
calculation debate constituted an important discursive event in the history
of neoliberalism by constituting socialism as a laboratory of economic
knowledge. While the realization of laboratory “experiments” in socialist
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would emerge later, this debate
provided the resources for interpreting and translating them.
But in order for this discursive event to have the effect it eventually
did, the socialist laboratory had to be connected by strong and permanent
ties to debates in Western economics. In this section, we merely highlighted
the two competing strategies of translation brought forth in the course of
the debate, each attempting to mobilize the results obtained in the lab-
oratory and make them count in Western economics. In the next section,
however, we will consider the forging of transnational ties between Amer-
ican and East European economists in two competing networks: the larger
and more established one based on the neoclassical translation strategy
of formal equivalence, and a smaller network, somewhat parasitical on
the first, based on the Austrian strategy. In the third and last section, we
will show that this latter translation strategy served to align the interests
of the American and East European economists who formulated the blue-
prints for market transition in 1989.
EAST-WEST DIALOGUE DURING THE 1950s AND 1960s
To translate and mobilize the results obtained in the socialist laboratory
into arguments about market relations, economists needed to build trans-
national networks. While the goal of our analysis is to demonstrate how
neoliberalism was put together by a transnational network organized
around the Austrian translation strategy, the story must begin elsewhere.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, by far the larger and more consequential
network was the one organized around mathematical economics and the
translation strategy of formal equivalence. This network was constructed
with the support of the U.S. government and American philanthropic
foundations, which were interested in establishing East-West dialogue as
a means of fighting the cultural Cold War. Neoliberalism, on the other
hand, was constructed within a secondary network, usually without of-
ficial support, and typically parasitical on the confidences established by
the primary one.
There were three interrelated efforts of the U.S. government and Amer-
ican philanthropic foundations, which provided the infrastructure for
transnational dialogue. First, the U.S. government provided funding for
mathematical economics, which quickly established the operational details
of the very form of planning outlined by Lange. U.S. government officials
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became convinced of the usefulness of mathematical economics during
the Second World War. In the process of solving military distribution
problems, George Dantzig and later Tjalling Koopmans developed linear
programming. They brought these techniques to the military consulting
agency, RAND, and to the Cowles Commission, which became centers
of quantitative analysis. Also as part of the war effort, John von Neumann
and Oskar Morgenstern had developed game theoretic analyses of eco-
nomic questions, and Wassily Leontief applied his recently developed
input-output analysis to find a solution for the problem of labor reallo-
cation after the war. Mathematical economics became the center of a
hegemonic coalition—composed of mathematical economists, econome-
tricians, and Keynesians—dominating American economics. They were
united by an interpretation of the Great Depression as proof that markets
required state intervention in order to function efficiently and by the
translation strategy of formal equivalence between markets and planning.
Linear programming, for example, was interpreted as a demonstration
that, under specified conditions, the results of market transactions and
planning directives were mathematically equivalent. This interpretation
of mathematical technique, as well as the bias toward some form of plan-
ning, made this field particularly suited for an East-West dialogue (Bern-
stein 2001; Kelley 1997, p. vii; Morgan 1990; Morgan and Rutherford
1998; Poundstone 1993; Weintraub 1985; Yonay 1998, pp. 184–95).
Second, many American economists answered the Cold War call to
study the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which led to the emergence
of the field of “comparative economic systems,” which was funded by
government and foundation money. Throughout the country, centers for
the study of the Soviet Union and other regions opened, most notably the
Russian Institute at Columbia University in 1946 and the Russian Re-
search Center at Harvard University in 1947 (Cummings 1998; Fisher
1959; Fleron and Hoffman 1993; Gleason 1995; Robin 2001). The op-
portunities for funding and positions in the area of Sovietology, as well
as the apparent economic success of the Soviet Union, created much
interest in research on comparative economic systems. We should em-
phasize, however, that the field of comparative economic systems was
larger than Sovietology per se. Some American academics interested in
studying Soviet planning were not Sovietologists but mathematical econ-
omists who found in Soviet planning an important site to test their tools
(Prybyla 1969, p. viii). If mathematical planning furnished a common
language for East-West dialogue, federally funded research on compar-
ative economic systems incorporated this language within a research pro-
gram capable of translating East European data into theoretical ad-
vancements in the study of capitalism.
Third, such a dialogue was actually conducted within the framework
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of East-West academic exchanges sponsored by the U.S. government and
American foundations. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the U.S. and Soviet
governments, as well as those of Eastern Europe, negotiated new forms
of contact, including academic exchanges, which each side sought to use
for its own Cold War purposes.5 U.S. government officials saw academic
exchange as a means of undermining socialist regimes by infiltrating the
closed, totalitarian states with American ideas and values (Barghoorn
1960; Raynor 2000, p. 101; Sutton 1987). Economics in particular were
considered a “gateway science” that could lead to broader economic and
political discussions. Policy makers were “hoping that consideration of
individual preference in markets and prices eventually could lead to sim-
ilar attention to individual preferences in political selection.”6 Academic
exchanges included long- and short-term research and teaching visits.
Sovietologists and practitioners of “comparative economic systems” study-
ing socialist economies constituted the largest group of economists in-
volved in academic exchanges, but there were also many others interested
in linear programming and mathematical planning tools and the useful-
ness of East European economies as another case in their research. The
latter were particularly instrumental in creating another form of East-
West dialogue, namely East-West conferences that included roughly equal
numbers of participants from capitalist and socialist countries. These con-
ferences increased in number from 1961 onward and usually were or-
ganized around some aspect of mathematical planning. The largest East-
West conferences were the input-output congresses organized by Wassily
Leontief and his colleagues at Harvard University. These congresses took
place every few years. By 1970, the congress in Novosibirsk in the Soviet
Union brought together thousands of participants. Similarly, the Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) at Vienna was
created to serve as a place where American and Eastern European schol-
ars could work together, on a long-term basis, on common problems such
as econometric modeling, management issues, and world climate change.7
5 While some American academics traveled to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
soon after 1953 on one-month tourist visas, the first American academic exchange
agreement was signed with the Soviet Union in 1958. The Ford Foundation established
exchanges with Poland in 1957, Yugoslavia in 1959, Hungary in 1962, Romania in
1965, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Bulgaria in 1968. See Byrnes (1976) and Richmond
(1987).
6 Ford Foundation archives, reel 2346/grant no. 64-432; letter from Earl O. Heady at
Iowa State University to Shepard Stone at the Ford Foundation, April 20, 1965, p. 2.
7 Johnson and Kennedy administration officials, the Ford Foundation, RAND, and
the U.S. State Department developed the rationale and organization of IIASA, which
was envisioned as encouraging the communication of scientists and creating a form
of détente, as well as undermining socialism. See Ford Foundation archives, Industrial
Societies Project box, as well as reels R-2679 and R-2680.
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Numerous smaller scale meetings also took place, such as the East-West
Conference on Economic Decision and Planning Models for Agriculture
that Earl Heady started in 1967 with 39 economists from East and West.8
The International Economics Association also sponsored small-scale East-
West meetings, such as the “labor productivity” conferences organized by
John T. Dunlop, Abram Bergson, and Walter Galenson in 1961, which
continued annually with about 30 participants. These conferences had
lasting affects. Almost every conference resulted in an edited volume, thus
providing the opportunity to further the exchange of knowledge generated
by these events. Many economists maintained correspondence with their
colleagues in Eastern Europe, which included discussions of ideas and
techniques as well as the exchange of articles and books. American schol-
ars found it easy to send books because, upon request, the CIA would
purchase and send books in any scholar’s name to individuals in the East
Bloc.
Such was the infrastructure of Cold War–era dialogue between East
and West. Its common language, as well as numerous research programs,
was provided by mathematical economics, in particular anything per-
taining to mathematical planning. Academic exchanges and conferences
allowed the construction of a transnational network of economists. But
why were the two sides interested in this dialogue at all? And how were
their interests translated and aligned?
Contrary to popular belief, East Europeans who participated in aca-
demic exchanges and conferences were not necessarily “party hacks,” but
highly regarded scientists and academically oriented policy makers. East
European economists had a great interest in mathematical economics,
linear programming, and econometrics for professional, political, and per-
sonal reasons. During the 1950s and 1960s, from Stalin’s death to the
Prague Spring and the launching of the “new economic mechanism” in
Hungary, most East European regimes witnessed a continuous struggle
between hard-line Stalinist factions in power and anti-Stalinist reformers
seeking to take their place. The reformers supported a group of economists
who argued for market reform and the decentralization of planning. They
also argued for the use of mathematical economics, linear programming,
and econometrics because these techniques allowed economists to create
an area of ideologically neutral economic discourse that would take place
under the jurisdiction of the profession. The reformers thus wielded a
powerful discourse of technical expertise with which to challenge their
opponents. In return, whenever they gained a foothold in power, the anti-
Stalinists provided these economists with professional institutions, re-
8 Ford Foundation Archives, letter from Gordon to Stone, January 3, 1967, East-West
Conference on Economic Decision and Planning Models for Agriculture.
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sources, political protection, and influential positions in state and party
economic institutions. In this way, the cause of political reforms, the idea
of market socialism, and the delineation of an area of technical economic
discussion protected from ideological accusations were bundled together
in one politico-professional project. Put differently, the project of “reform
economics” was at once a drive for political reform and for profession-
alization (Bockman 2000). Mathematical economics and mathematical
planning were crucial components of this professional project because
their highly formal nature made it easier to present them as outside the
realm of ideology and because linear programming and similar techniques
implied the possibility of a middle road between markets and central
planning, which was homologous with the aim of the reformers in the
political sphere. Thus, the East-West dialogue and its resulting network
could bolster the professional and political projects of at least a large
fraction of East European economists.
The strategy of formal equivalence served to translate these interests
and align them with those of Western economists who participated in the
dialogue. John Kenneth Galbraith recalls that, during his 1958 trip to
Poland, “at dinner one economist, another agreeing, made an impressive
point. He said, ‘We have argued against our more orthodox colleagues
that there can be sustained growth under capitalism. Now with the re-
cession we already hear it said that we were wrong. Do you realize what
a test this is for your economy—and for our reputations?’” (Galbraith
1958, p. 72).
Formal equivalence meant that the professionalization project of East
European economists, as well as the reformers’ struggle against the hard-
liners, could be translated and aligned with the interests of Western econ-
omists who were champions of Keynesianism and mathematical econom-
ics. This translation served as the basis for a highly advantageous
exchange between the two sides. First, the academic exchanges organized
by the Ford Foundation provided East European economists with money,
resources, and time to conduct research.9 Second, and even more impor-
tant, the exchanges provided grantees with a crash course of immersion
in the American economics profession. Most participants visited the
United States for a 10-month period. They gained firsthand experience
9 See the appendix for a list of names and titles of Hungarian economists who partic-
ipated in Ford Foundation exchanges from 1964 to 1969. Many Polish and Yugoslavian
economists also participated in Ford Foundation exchanges in this period. We would
like to underline the point that almost all of the individuals listed were not known as
“party hacks,” but as reform economists, some of whom went ahead to play a major
role in reformist politics. Unless otherwise indicated, this information came from the
Ford Foundation archives and final reports written by grantees. See Ford Foundation
Archives, reels 2346 and 2347.
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with the American university system through affiliation with one or two
top-ranked universities, primarily Harvard, but also the University of
California at Berkeley and at Los Angeles, Stanford, MIT, and others. In
addition to studying intensively at their affiliated universities, they also
visited numerous campuses throughout the country. They went to semi-
nars, gave lectures, and worked with professors. Third, they acquired new
skills—including computer programming and input-output modeling—as
well as books, periodicals, newspapers, and economic data, all of which
they brought back home with them.10 Fourth, they developed social ties
and social skills (in particular improved English language skills), which
made further exchanges significantly easier and more regular. Grantees
attended professional meetings, such as those of the American Economic
Association, the American Statistical Association, and the Econometric
Society. They also received a two-year subscription to a journal of their
choice when their exchange year ended. When they returned from ex-
changes and conferences, grantees could use their personal contacts in the
United States to obtain more books, journals, and data. They could use
the international prestige of their Western colleagues, especially Nobel
laureates, to support careers at home and obtain invitations for future
visits to the United States. These personal contacts improved the econ-
omists’ professional work environment and provided alternative sources
of funding and recognition.11
In return, their Western colleagues could use these exchanges to forge
ever more extensive actor-networks and to mobilize the work of distant
participants. Formal equivalence meant that they could interpret their
transactions with East European economists as reinforcing the universal
nature of their models. This alignment of interests also entailed a partic-
ular division of labor. American economists occupied an “obligatory point
of passage” within the network, controlling the flow of resources to col-
leagues around the world and concentrating the results of their work in
their hands. The whole translation and alignment of interests depended
on “black boxing” the work going on in Eastern Europe and interpreting
10 Western economic texts inclusive of Adam Smith and Keynes were by no means
unavailable and a restricted group of experts could use them. The use of Western
literature has been obscured by the fact that most economists did not cite it for fear
of political persecution. Egon Balas (2000), e.g., a Romanian mathematical economist,
remembered meeting Hungarian economist, Tamas Nagy, who told Balas to not cite
Keynes but to present Keynes’s ideas in his own name. The extensive use of Western
texts has been measured, though problematically, through scientometric studies of
citations. For the case of Hungary, see Such and Tóth (1989).
11 As János Kornai remembered, “the regime in Hungary did follow what was hap-
pening to me, so they knew of my foreign acceptance and reputation, which widened
my opportunities for writing” (Blanchard 1999).
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the contributions of East European economists as simply “data,” the
“facts” about another interesting, yet formally equivalent case. The story
of Wassily Leontief exemplifies these processes. Leontief was born in Rus-
sia before the revolution, studied economics in Russia, and completed his
graduate work in the 1920s in Germany, where he began to develop his
input-output analysis. As a professor at Harvard University from the
1930s, Leontief participated in all three interrelated efforts of the Cold
War mentioned above.12 He obtained federal financing to develop an
input-output model for analyzing the problem of labor reallocation. He
was also a key player in the emerging field of “comparative economic
systems,” as a founding member of the Russian Research Center. He
argued that his input-output analysis was applicable to any economic
system. It was a tool that allowed one to evaluate the relative efficiency
of economic systems. Finally, he organized East-West exchanges and con-
ferences with the particular vision that input-output analysis could pro-
vide a common language across the Iron Curtain. In 1959, he traveled
with a Harvard University delegation to Moscow to initiate an exchange
program there. In the early 1960s, he actively supported the formation
of an institute for East-West discussions, which later became IIASA.
Moreover, he maintained an extensive correspondence with East Euro-
pean economists, sending them articles and books through the CIA. He
included their articles in his edited volumes, and he invited them and
many others from around the globe to his input-output conferences, as
well as to visit and to work with him at Harvard.
While he generally viewed these transnational interactions as having
a positive role promoting world peace, Leontief also placed himself as an
obligatory point of passage within this transnational network. Leontief
had a specifically scientific interest in creating transnational linkages be-
cause he sought to build a world input-output model, expanding from his
original model limited to “only” the American economy. For that purpose,
he needed to mobilize a vast group of economists and other experts from
around the globe who could construct their own input-output tables. This
required technical instruction in making these tables, but also the stan-
dardization of national economic data worldwide, as well as improve-
ments in computer processing speeds.13 As a result of his continual in-
12 The following information about Leontief came from documents in the Wassily
Leontief papers at the Harvard University archives.
13 Leontief’s ideas about world modeling can be found in Leontief (1977). By 1968,
input-output models had been constructed for more than 50 countries and applied to
hundreds of specific problems (Chenery 1970). In March 1968, the UN adopted a new
system of national accounts (SNA), revising those from 1952. In the new system of
standards, input-output data was integrated into the new system (Aidenoff 1970). A
critical analysis of the world modeling movement can be found in Ashley (1983).
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ternational networking, Leontief made input-output modeling a very
successful enterprise by the 1960s. He received an enormous number of
requests for consultations with both government agencies and compa-
nies.14 As he forged an ever-more-international network, he bolstered his
own position at its center. His office in Harvard was an obligatory point
of passage for money, data, and other resources used by input-output
analysts and by the same token the site where the work of foreign econ-
omists was mobilized, translated, and accumulated as “data,” or as further
proofs of a universal model. Thus, while we would argue that input-
output analysis is a good example of a transnational network, his own
status as an obligatory point of passage allowed Leontief to declare that
input-output modeling was an approach to economics that “originated in
the United States” (1963, p. 101).
This capacity to position oneself as an obligatory point of passage, we
argue, was responsible for the fact that these Cold War–era transnational
networks were typically forgotten or their significance minimized. The
network structure thus created mobilized the work of East European
economists, while translating and aligning their interests, but at the same
time obscured its own functioning because such contributions were seen
as merely “data” or reports from direct “experience,” rather than the pro-
duction of economic knowledge. We found many informal reports by
American participants in exchanges and conferences that testified to their
continual “amazement” at how well-versed in mathematical economics
their East European colleagues were. For example, when Leontief trav-
eled to Moscow in 1959, still before he launched his international input-
output conferences, he was surprised to find the widespread use of input-
output analysis, the publication of his books, and a large, developed group
of input-output modelers (Leontief 1963). Nonetheless, such “discoveries”
were interpreted as the exception that proved the rule. American econ-
omists assumed that East European economic knowledge was nothing
but the ideological charade of Marxist-Leninist political economy. As a
result, the contributions of East European economists were accepted as
merely facts about Eastern Europe gained through direct experience and
thus as powerful independent proof of Western economic science. Writing
about mathematical economics in the Soviet Union, Robert Campbell, for
example, found Russian economists using utility functions similar to those
developed in Western economics. He did not, however, think that they
found these in Western textbooks, but that these functions were developed
from the experience of central planning, which thus served to empirically
14 These numerous requests can be found in Leontief’s papers, Harvard University
archives.
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and independently verify the truth of these utility functions.15 One can
see how the translation strategy of formal equivalence permitted Campbell
to construe this similarity not as a result of scholarly communication and
network ties, but as an experience gained by trying to solve the same
essential problem through “trial and error,” just as Lange recommended.
We find, therefore, that mathematical economics was the common lan-
guage of an institutionalized form of East-West dialogue during the Cold
War period and that this dialogue was both permitted and obscured by
the translation strategy of formal equivalence and by the positioning of
Western economists at obligatory points of passage within the network.
This translation strategy aligned the interests of East European econo-
mists, who used these contacts in their combined drive for economic
reform and professionalization, with those of their Western colleagues,
who mobilized them as “data” to bolster the universal applicability of
their models.
Alongside this dominant network of exchanges, however, there was
another dialogue conducted between Western libertarian economists and
some of their East European colleagues. Here, again, a similar alignment
of interests developed, though now governed by the Austrian translation
strategy. The American market libertarians sought out their East Euro-
pean colleagues, within the framework of existing East-West exchanges
and conferences, in order to enlist their support in the battles they had
to fight back home against the Keynesian orthodoxy. The Austrian trans-
lation strategy permitted these economists to use the knowledge produced
by their East European colleagues as evidence from laboratory experi-
ments, which proved, under controlled conditions, the bankruptcy of the
remedies, policies, and thinking of their Keynesian opponents. As we shall
see in the next section, however, their Eastern European interlocutors
were interested in the exchanges with the libertarians because they were
engaged in battles over professional jurisdiction and market reforms and
because in the course of these struggles they too used the Austrian trans-
lation strategy to undermine and discredit their opponents. Hence what
15 Campbell (1963) discusses the work of A. A. Konius, who attempted to find the
proper relationship between the prices of consumer goods, and the labor inputs used
in their production, with the aim of minimizing the total labor input. He argues,
“Incidentally, Konius’ question is not one made up in the quiet of the professor’s study
but one that has long agitated those who plan the prices of consumer goods in the
Soviet Union. The answer given by Western economists to this question appears in
every elementary economics textbook as ‘prices should be proportional both to the
marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rates of transformation of the goods
in question.’ Not being accustomed to consulting this kind of source for answers to
questions of socialist political economy, Konius enlisted the aid of a professor of math-
ematics (duly thanked in a footnote) and worked out the answer himself. Not sur-
prisingly, he came to the same conclusion” (p. 117).
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the Americans mobilized as “evidence” from laboratory experiments can-
not be separated from the rhetorical strategies deployed by radical re-
formers in Eastern Europe. Neoliberalism, as we know it, developed
within this East-West dialogue and traveled back to the United States
through transnational networks, eventually to become hegemonic.
In the 1950s and 1960s, libertarians were a distinct and embattled
minority among American economists, mostly concentrated in the Uni-
versity of Chicago (Kelley 1997; Stigler 1988). Chicago-trained economists
also created centers of libertarian thinking in the University of Virginia
and the University of California, Los Angeles. Frank Knight, Milton
Friedman, and others at Chicago were engaged in on-going battles within
the economics profession against the Keynesians and mathematical econ-
omists particularly at the Cowles Commission. Being a minority within
the American economics profession, libertarian economists sought refuge
in international libertarian associations, most importantly the Mont Pe-
lerin Society, with the financial support of conservative foundations (Cock-
ett 1995; Friedman and Friedman 1998; Kelley 1997).16 Even more im-
portant, for our purposes, were a series of East-West conferences in Italy
running from 1965 to the mid-1980s. These conferences were organized
by Renato Mieli, who had been a high-level Italian Communist Party
leader, but left the party after 1956 and ran a think tank in Milan called
the Center for the Study of Economic and Social Problems (Centro Studi
e Ricerche su Problemi Economico-Sociali, or CESES). Mieli was well
connected in Eastern Europe and knew many leading economists. At the
same time, he became integrated into the emerging American libertarian
network through Warren Nutter, an economist from the University of
Virginia and former student of Milton Friedman.17 American conservative
organizations funded both the conferences and a summer institute for
American and Italian graduate students. These meetings focused on the
problems of socialist economies and the nature of economic reforms in
Eastern Europe. Some of the conferences were titled “Prices and Economic
16 In 1947, a small group of libertarians met in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, to create
an association that would allow like-minded scholars to speak freely and to develop
libertarian ideas. This view of the Mont Pelerin Society as a refuge from daily attacks
is very clear in Hartwell (1995). See also Friedman and Friedman (1998, pp. 159, 333).
Conservative foundations funded both Hayek’s position in Chicago and Mises’ position
at New York University (Friedman and Friedman 1998, p. 161; Kelley 1997, pp. 62,
64).
17 On his 1967 and 1969 trips to the United States, Renato Mieli met also with William
J. Baroody, Sr. (president of the American Enterprise Institute), Richard Ware (director
of the Earhart Foundation), and other right-wing leaders. William J. Baroody, Sr.,
Papers, Library of Congress (LOC), box 79, folder 11, Organizations File, American
Enterprise Institute, Scholars and Fellows Program, Nutter, G. Warren, 1966–67; and
box 88, folder 5, Organizations File, CESES (Renato Mieli), 1969–79.
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Reform,” “Investment Policy,” and “Managerial Incentives in East and
West.” In general, the conferences took place in luxurious villas in Italy,
which allowed for enjoyable formal discussions, as well as private talks
around the pool or at dinner.18
One could interpret the CESES meetings one-sidedly, as American neo-
liberals indoctrinating socialist economists in the new truth. Similarly, one
could view them as preaching to the converted, as the East European
economists already were convinced of the bankruptcy of communism and
were neoliberals at heart. However, participants actually represented a
broader range of political views, from Western market socialists such as
Alec Nove to staunch libertarians such as Milton Friedman. At least one
American participant, who had not known who the American organizers
were, found Friedman to be “so purely right wing” and not in line with
the rest of the Western participants.19 The essential fallacy is to project
backwards this contemporary label—neoliberalism—that has a fairly
wide, and somewhat fuzzy, classificatory purchase. The American par-
ticipants were not neoliberals per se, but rather libertarians, namely they
shared a negative agenda being antistate, antiplanning, and anticom-
munist, but not a well-defined positive agenda of economic theory. The
East European economists too were not neoliberals, but rather reform
economists or market socialists, who sought to incorporate markets into
a planning system. In the 1960s, this was clearly the agenda of Hungarian
reformers such as Janos Kornai and Tamas Nagy, who participated in
CESES meetings. “Neoliberalism” is precisely what became possible
through these meetings, wherein these two distinct sets of interests were
aligned by means of the Austrian translation strategy and on the common
ground provided by the laboratory of reform socialism.
In the next section, we discuss the interests of the East European econ-
omists and how they were translated and aligned. For the moment, we
shall concentrate on the group of American libertarian economists. They
were sincerely interested in dialogue with East European economists be-
cause they believed that in this way they were working to undermine
18 Between 1967 and 1973, of the 257 participants in the conferences, 93 were from
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A large part of the 257 participants were from
Italy because the conferences were usually in Italy and the Italian founders wanted
to focus on teaching Italian academics about East European economies. Between 1967
and 1975, of the 37 lecturers in the summer institute for graduate students, 23 of them
were from Eastern Europe. Here, 98 American graduate students participated in the
institute, while similar numbers or more Italians participated. William J. Baroody, Sr.,
Papers, LOC, “Program for Academic Communication and Exchange,” Thomas Jef-
ferson Center Foundation, June 16, 1975, annex B, C, D.
19 Confidential interview conducted April 11, 2001, with an American economist who
participated in the CESES meetings.
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socialism. No less important, however, the Austrian translation strategy
meant that they also interpreted these exchanges as promising to bolster
their own weak position back in the United States. To translate their
interests in this way, however, libertarian economists had to construe East
European economists as outsiders to Western debates, unfamiliar with
Western literature. Thus, Milton Friedman remembered one of the CESES
meetings, where they “heard a brilliant talk by a Hungarian Marxist
economist. He had rediscovered for himself Adam Smith’s invisible hand”
(Friedman and Friedman 1998, p. 338). This move permitted them to
scrutinize the discourse of East European economists in a way not possible
when dealing with Western colleagues and to open the “black boxes” of
which this discourse was composed. American libertarians then divided
East European discourse into two parts: one intelligible, and the other
redundant. The intelligible part consisted of “the facts” about socialist
economies. While incompetent in matters of theory, the East European
economists were presumed competent in regards to the empirical realities
of their own socialist economies. Hence, one could treat their discourse
as a credible report on reality, rather than controversial theoretical prop-
ositions. The redundant part was composed of ideological rhetoric. East
European economists had to use a form of coded language in order to
protect themselves from the communist authorities back home. This part
of their speech could be disregarded altogether. Thus, in 1967, after meet-
ing an East European economist in a CESES conference, a right-wing
foundation leader told Warren Nutter that “it was our feeling that his
idea of reform was still a very long way from advocating a free market
system.” Nutter replied that East Europeans had to speak in an “Aesopian
language”: “Those who are accustomed to participating in such exchanges
learn to recognize the key words in this coded language and to respond
with appropriate key words until rapport is established.”20 Nutter thus
indicated that some parts of the speech of East European economists
should be disregarded; the rest could only be conveyed through the me-
diation of competent interpreters, such as libertarian economists.
As a result, Nutter and the libertarians obscured the fact that East
European economists, particularly those who attended such conferences
as CESES, had long had access to Western literature and had long debated
the nature of socialism and the necessary reforms with Western colleagues
in similar forums. As we shall see in the next section, these economists
were neither reporting merely the facts, nor was their true vision of reform
masked by coded language. But such representations allowed American
20 William J. Baroody, Sr., Papers, LOC, letter from Donald A. Collins, T. Mellon and
Sons to Warren Nutter, May 9, 1967; William J. Baroody, Sr., Papers, LOC, draft
confidential letter from Warren Nutter to Donald A. Collins, May 11, 1967.
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libertarians to use East European economists as “naı̈ve witnesses” re-
porting from inside the black box of mathematical planning and thus to
take it apart. According to Nutter, who attended the 1966 conference:
It was readily apparent that the Eastern participants were more eager to
hear from Western supporters of the market than from Western sympa-
thizers of socialism. They have nothing to learn from the latter and in fact
have something to teach them. The views of Western advocates of central
planning must appear naı̈ve, indeed, to those so experienced in its actual
workings.21
Through this perception of East European economists, American liber-
tarians could mobilize East European contributions and turn them into
weapons with which to fight their own battles in the United States. The
final step in this mobilization was to translate the East European critique
of planning, via the Austrian translation strategy, into a large-scale lab-
oratory experiment demonstrating the failures of Keynesian state inter-
vention: “Another way to illustrate the role of market systems is to describe
problems arising from experiments with administrative controls in com-
munist countries. Even though these countries have succeeded in gen-
erating economic growth, they have also been confronted by very much
the same problems that are generated by price controls in capitalist coun-
ties, though of course on a very much larger scale” (Lindbeck 1971, p.
40).22
To effect this translation, the libertarians brought Mieli and East Eu-
ropean economists to the United States to meet with foundation directors
and to give talks at university departments. Nutter argued that “such
visits would have an important educational value for Westerners as well
as Easterners. I can think of no more effective antidote to the current
dirigiste mentality of academia than the message of these scholars from
21 William J. Baroody, Sr., Papers, LOC, confidential memorandum to W. J. Baroody
and others from G. W. Nutter, Subject: CESES Seminar, Florence, September 14–16,
1966. September 29, 1966, p. 4. Others, such as Turgeon (1971) and Portes (1983), did
notice that the East Europeans were using “right-wing” ideas, rather than merely
reporting the facts.
22 Compare an even stronger formulation by a later adherent of Austrian economics
and observer of the rise of neoliberalism: “Probably the most significant self-criticism
on the Left has come from Eastern Europe, where the failures of socialist policy are
closest at hand, and where the first murmurings of a wholesale rejection of planning
by radical intellectuals were heard. It is in Eastern Europe where ‘conservative’ means
‘defender of central planning’ and where ‘liberal’ means ‘proponent of decentralized
market institutions.’ It is there where the stirrings of a grassroots radicalism that
fundamentally objects to the whole idea of planning are to be found” (Lavoie 1985a,
p. 235).
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Eastern Europe.”23 They expected a similar effect from sending American
graduate students to Europe, to be “taught by the strongest critics of
planning: economists from Eastern Europe.”24 The libertarians construed
their East-West exchanges as working toward two, mutually reinforcing
goals: fomenting resistance to Communism in the East and translating it
into a transformation of hearts and minds in the West:
I know of few activities with greater potential payoff for a relatively tiny
investment than the conferences and contacts now being arranged through
Mieli. In many respects, the hope of the West lies in the East. The best
prospect for halting the plunge of the West into collectivism is revolt against
communism in the East. It would be romantic to expect any single activity
to move the course of history, but drops of water can wear away stone if
properly concentrated.25
Indeed, post hoc, American libertarians have reinterpreted the CESES
meetings as part of a vast libertarian network that successfully revolu-
tionized the world. According to Friedman and Friedman (1998), for ex-
ample, Mieli created CESES precisely in order to promote free-market
ideas (p. 338). What is missed, however, by presenting CESES as merely
one in a series of libertarian institutions dedicated to the same goal—the
Mont Pelerin Society, the Philadelphia Society, American Enterprise In-
stitute, Volker Foundation—is the fact that the transnational dialogue
reshaped both sides. It was not so much part of a successful libertarian
conspiracy to topple communism and Keynesianism in one blow, but the
breeding ground for the new hybrid discourse of neoliberalism, which
was being created through the process of translating, on both sides, the
knowledge produced by participants and mobilizing it to travel back to
United States, to fight the wars of deregulation, and back to Eastern
Europe, to fight the wars of reforming socialism. At the same time, this
process of translation and mobilization was marked by the unequal struc-
ture of the transnational network, in which Western economists formed
obligatory points of passage and mobilized East European knowledge as
data bolstering the universal applicability of their models. Nonetheless,
it is these hybrid and dialogic origins of neoliberalism, rather than the
arrogance and might of a Western monologue, that helps explain the
23 William J. Baroody, Sr., Papers, LOC, confidential memorandum to W. J. Baroody
and others from G. W. Nutter, Subject: CESES Seminar, Florence, September 14-16,
1966. September 29, 1966, pp. 5–6.
24 G. W. Nutter, undated [1975], draft paper, p. 2; William Baroody, Sr., Papers, LOC,
box 80, folder 2.
25 William J. Baroody, Sr., Papers, LOC, confidential memorandum to W. J. Baroody,
Sr., and others from G. W. Nutter, Subject: CESES Seminar, Florence, September 14-
16, 1966; September 29, 1966.
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course of the radical and rapid transition to capitalism in Eastern Europe,
once communism fell.
THE WASTELAND
When, after the revolutions of 1989, Western advisors arrived to Eastern
Europe, they reported back home that they found the economies of the
region in shambles. They discovered a world upside down, where the
rules of economic rationality were ignored, and the expert eye discerned
a vast wasteland of atrophied industrial growth, distorted price and in-
centive structures, shortages, and rent-seeking. They concluded that rad-
ical surgery was needed to remove the ruins of communism, create a
blank slate, and reconstruct economic institutions from scratch: “Because
the party was the state, the state collapsed from the top when the party
fell and a great void opened up. This suggests a great opportunity because
of the amount of destruction” (Aslund 1992, p.16; see also Lipton and
Sachs 1990).
Western economists believed that they were bringing a new worldview,
knowledge, and practice to this blank slate of Eastern Europe. As we
now know, however, East European economists had been participating
in East-West dialogues about markets and planning for decades. Within
these transnational networks, the interests of Western and East European
economists were translated and aligned as the latter used the resources
provided by the former to fight for professional jurisdiction and political
clout, while Western economists had imported East European knowledge
into the United States as “facts” and as undeniable proof of their universal
models extracted from the laboratory of socialism. We argue that the rapid
adoption of neoliberalism in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism
was simply another instance of this translation and alignment of interests.
Western economists’ diagnosis of East European economies as wastelands,
for example, did not reflect the economic situation as they found it, but
the assessments conveyed to them by East European reformers and econ-
omists. It was another case where the knowledge produced by East Eu-
ropean economists was construed as simply a report on the “facts.” Let
us be clear: we are not arguing whether this diagnosis was correct or
whether it accurately reflected economic reality.26 Our point is simply that
the social genesis of this diagnosis, as well as the prescription of “shock
therapy,” should not be sought in the arrogance of Western advisers, but
26 Moreover, we would argue, with Jessop (1999), that “economic crises involve more
than a final encounter with pre-given structural limits. They are manifested and re-
solved in an inter-discursive field . . . through which social forces assert their identities
and interests” (p. 396).
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in the discourse developed by East European reformers and economists,
who in the course of successive attempts at reform, and in the context of
transnational network ties with Western libertarians, have developed a
vision of the socialist economy as chaotic, inefficient, and in need of shock
therapy. Such a vision was neither simply true nor false, but it was cer-
tainly partial, taken as it was from a particular corner of the social field
and reflecting the experiences of one specific contender in the struggles
over the reforms. Moreover, this was an influential vision: the East Eu-
ropean economists we quote here—Balcerowicz, Gaidar, Klaus, Kornai,
Yavlinsky—were all-powerful political actors during the transition, rang-
ing from special advisers through finance ministers to prime ministers.
At least three independent factors interacted to create this vision and
to steer it in the direction of such a radical diagnosis and prescription:
(1) the “push” factor provided by the on-going struggle over successive
attempts at economic reform, (2) the “pull” factor provided by the growing
attraction of the dissident discourse of “antipolitics,” and (3) the Austrian
translation strategy that construed the relations of central planning as
submerged, distorted, and subordinated market relations, thus aligning
the interests of East European reformers with those of Western critics of
Keynesianism.
In their own accounts, East European economists felt “pushed” into
becoming neoliberals as a result of their experience with reforms during
socialism.27 Typically, they depict this experience as a series of failures,
which clarified to them that the state socialist economy could not be
reformed and needed to be abandoned altogether. We have no doubt that
participation in the reform effort and the consequent disappointment
played a major role in turning East European economists into shock
therapists. This experience, however, must be interpreted in light of the
fact that the struggle over the reforms was also a struggle over professional
jurisdiction. For example, most of the reforms proposed by Hungarian,
Czechoslovak, Polish, and Soviet economists during the 1960s and 1970s
sought to decentralize the economy and give enterprises greater autonomy,
while restricting central planning to regulation through indirect economic
tools, such as subsidies and credits (Sik 1972). If fully implemented, such
measures would have wrested jurisdiction over the economy from the
hands of the politically trained bureaucrats, who relayed commands from
the top down and supervised the behavior of state enterprises, and would
27 See, e.g., Leszek Balcerowicz’s “personal reflections” (Balcerowicz 1995, pp. 51–58,
341–43); or Vaclav Klaus’s summary of the lessons of reforms (Klaus 1989, pp. 31–52);
or János Kornai’s powerful denunciations of reform thinking (Kornai 1995, pp. 1–34;
Kornai 1990, pp. 58–77). For a more ambiguous account, which nonetheless concedes
that the experience of reforms has turned the reformers into “transformers,” see Kovács
(1992).
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have transferred this control to economists. These reforms included leg-
islation requiring the employment of thousands of economists, who would
know how to measure the economic performance of enterprises and to
calculate the interest rates and subsidies needed to regulate them “indi-
rectly.” No wonder, therefore, that bureaucrats aligned themselves with
party hard-liners and vigorously resisted the reforms. Decentralizing re-
forms would have marginalized their expertise and subordinated them to
the economists (Bockman 2000). As a result of these jurisdictional con-
frontations, reforms faltered according to a predictable sequence: first, the
reformers drafted reform blueprints and implemented them; then, the
bureaucracy sabotaged those plans, which led to inefficiencies and losses;
then came the inevitable political backlash against the reforms; finally,
the backlash turned into bargaining, tinkering, and modifying elements
of the reform to suit the political balance of forces.
East European economists developed their economic ideas and, for
some, their radical reform stance within the crucible of the struggle over
professional jurisdiction and the cycle of reform. As their bid for profes-
sional jurisdiction was blocked, there were two characteristic responses
of economists, each corresponding to one of the translation strategies
inherited from the debate about socialist economic calculation, and each
seeking to align their interests with different allies. A large group of
economists turned to the neoclassical translation strategy of “formal equiv-
alence” and focused on developing ever-more sophisticated mathematical
models. These economists effectively chose to circumscribe their juris-
diction so as to avoid direct confrontations with the bureaucracy. They
claimed jurisdiction over the realm of simulation and speaking from it
tried to engage economic decision-makers in a dialogue and to influence
them. The common basis for this dialogue was provided by the idea of
the “scientific-technological revolution,” which the authorities too agreed
created new challenges and opportunities for Communism. They pre-
sented computerization, in particular, as promising to reconcile in the
future the competing claims of bureaucrats and economists (Lange 1967;
Richta et al. 1969).
The Austrian translation strategy, on the other hand, corresponded to
a frontal counterattack on economic decision makers and an attempt to
bring them, too, under the jurisdiction of economists.28 Thus, it was typ-
ically the choice of economists like the Czech Vaclav Klaus, who partic-
ipated in CESES meetings in the late 1960s, at a time when he was still
28 Indeed, economists in this group cite a fundamental debt to Hayek and Mises, and
were involved during the 1980s in heretical “apartment seminars” and secretive reading
projects of the Austrian thinkers (Balcerowicz 1995, pp. 35–50, 340–41; Csizmadia
1995; Klaus 1991; Komárek 1994–95).
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a strong supporter of reforming socialist economies. However, he fell vic-
tim to the backlash phase of the reform cycle (which in Czechoslovakia
in 1969 was quite intense), was demoted, and his career was blocked.
Consequently during the 1970s and 1980s his views radicalized (Eyal
2000). In contrast to their mathematical colleagues, who limited their
analyses to simulations of the economic sphere, these more radical re-
formers have undertaken to apply economic analysis especially to political
and bureaucratic institutions, since they perceived these to be the main
impediments to reform (Balcerowicz 1995, pp. 1–16, 341–44; Klaus and
Triska 1989; Kornai 1992). The disappointed and downwardly mobile
reformers began to include political institutions within the definition of
the economic, under their jurisdiction, in order to show that the obstacles
or inertia that their reforms have encountered were not an external factor,
but a structural component of the economic system, itself in need of
reform. Hence they could use the Austrian translation strat-
egy—encapsulated in concepts like “repressed inflation,” “hidden unem-
ployment,” or “disequilibrium”—to rename and reclassify features of bu-
reaucratic planning as systematic distortions of underlying market
processes and thus align their interests with those of Western critics of
bureaucratic inefficiency, for example “public choice” economists:
Reform economics was capable of providing an authentic in vivo analysis
of economic disequilibrium (shortage), centralization (monopolies) and hi-
erarchical bargaining, business cycles, state redistribution, nonmonetary
transactions, shadow economy, and so on, namely, of those phenomena of
excessive market distortion which could otherwise only be examined in
normal market economies in small scale, almost in vitro. (Kovács 1992, pp.
318–19)
There was also a “pull” factor provided by the dissident discourse of
“antipolitics.” Antipolitics were not “apolitics.” The former involved first
and foremost a rejection of the teleological, constructive rationality of
social engineering and the proposal of a competing model of intellectual
work that was radically antiteleological. Any attempt to engineer society,
dissidents argued, was bound to achieve precisely the opposite goal be-
cause it would ruin the very fabric of civil society, namely the qualities
of individual freedom, responsibility, and self-determination. Instead, in-
tellectuals should act more like educators and pastors, who cultivate these
qualities for autonomous conduct (Eyal 2000, pp. 60–67; Konrad 1984;
Shore 1998). The radical reformers fused these ideas with their own cri-
tique into a wholesale rejection of the reform logic. The concept of “civil
society” thus served to recruit another set of allies by translating economic,
political, and moral interests into a single critique. As against “civil so-
ciety,” the radical reformers depicted a socialist system, which was all of
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a piece, a coherent, if distorted, whole, and one could not simply tinker
with this or that aspect of it in order to change it. Radical surgery was
needed to dismantle socialist state institutions, but not in order to engage
in another project of social engineering. Rather, reformers should act to
liberate the natural forces of the economy and civil society, the initiative
and ingenuity of responsible citizens (Balcerowicz 1995, pp. 1–16, 341–44;
Klaus and Triska 1989; Kornai 1992).
This new vision of the social role of intellectuals and economists, how-
ever, meant that these intellectuals arrived at the moment of transition
in 1989 burdened with a deep suspicion of “the people,” whom they knew
were not at all responsible or civil as required. This deep suspicion is
explained by their alliance with the dissidents and by their common quest
to act as pastors and moral leaders. Already during the 1970s and 1980s,
both radical reformers and dissidents had opposed the social contract of
“goulash communism,” which in their eyes made the population accom-
plices of the regime in the economic and moral sense (Pithart 1989–90).
This deep suspicion, rather than the arrogance of Western advisers, goes
a long way toward explaining the peculiar features of the transformation
strategy they proposed—that is, “shock therapy.” The need for shock ther-
apy, they explained, was to send a clear and unambiguous message to the
population and to the managers of economic enterprises that this was not
another “partial reform.” They couched this point both as a lesson from
the reform experience and as the implication of “rational expectations”
theory, or the theory of “cognitive dissonance,” thus translating and align-
ing their interests with some of the intellectual movements challenging
Keynesianism in the West (Mankiw 1990). Mere reforms tended to fail
because they were not radical enough; they were not able to overcome
the tendency of economic actors to act on the basis of the self-fulfilling
prophecy that things will remain the same and the tendency of the au-
thorities to renege on their policies (the inevitable political backlash); and
reform as it had heretofore been practiced did not produce a sharp enough
“cognitive dissonance” to disabuse economic actors of their old ways (Bal-
cerowicz 1995, pp. 51–58, 320–21, 342–44; Klaus 1989, pp. 45–48).
We see, therefore, how false it is to assume that “shock therapy” was
imposed on the postcommunist countries by Western economists and the
IMF. By the mid-1980s, virtually all the future “transformers” had already
reached the conclusion that the socialist economy was bankrupt. They
depicted it as nothing but a system of “destroyed capitalism,” suffering
from “extreme macroeconomic imbalance,” on the verge of a “macroeco-
nomic disaster.” There was no time to lose, but neither could one play
any longer with the sort of reforms, which were only “the imitation of
capitalism under increasingly relaxed constraints.” The only way to over-
come the economic problems of socialism was to transform it completely
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into market capitalism. Moreover, such transformation could not, by def-
inition, be achieved gradually, but must be implemented with the utmost
speed.
It is necessary to initiate [transition] out of “nothing,” from the situation of
misinforming prices expressing one-sidedly only costs, but not reflecting
thus far appreciation from the user’s side; from the situation of soft budg-
etary limitations . . . ; from the situation in which . . . loss of profitability
cannot be memento mori for the enterprise concerned. And yet there is no
other option than to delegate decision-making on structure to the enterprise
level “at once,” without waiting for prerequisites to be created for it. . . .
We must simply re-orientate ourselves with full consistency. . . . The first
step must be the shock of the realization that it is not possible to continue
steering the old course. (Jezek and Turek 1989, p. 66)29
The overnight implementation of neoliberal stabilization and liberali-
zation policies in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union
during 1989–91 was thus not simply a ceremonial bow to the orthodox
Western doctrine, “the transition according to Cambridge, Mass.” (Murrell
1995), but was interpreted by East European economic transformers as
in direct continuity with the lessons they have learned from the era of
reform. If the stories and recommendations of the radical reformers ac-
corded with Western neoliberals, at least for the time being, this was
neither because they were the truth about economic reality, nor because
they reflected the need to accommodate the wishes of Western lending
institutions,30 but because of the Austrian translation strategy that over
time, in the course of transnational dialogue during the Cold War, aligned
their interests. Many of the new economic decision makers, or their ad-
visers, who undertook to draw transition blueprints and implement them,
had participated earlier in East-West conferences and academic ex-
changes. In Russia, Prime Minister Gaidar’s team of economists included,
among others, Petr O. Aven, Stanislav Shatalin, and E. Yasin, all of whom
worked with Western economists in Vienna’s IIASA. Two of the top
economic advisers to the Hungarian government, Janos Kornai and Ta-
mas Nagy, participated in Mieli’s East-West conferences, though one
29 See also Balcerowicz (1995, pp. 51–58, 314–20, 341–43, 365). He notes that on the
matter of “shock therapy” he had complete agreement with the Russian economists
Kagalovski, Yavlinsky, and Gaidar.
30 “One should distinguish between external influences with respect to the content of
the economic program and those factors that affected internal support for the program.
In the Polish case, the latter was much more important than the former. In negotiations
with the IMF, multilateral banks and Western governments, there was very little
pressure with respect to economic strategy and its crucial details because the Polish
program was basically in line with the goals of these organizations” (Balcerowicz 1995,
p. 310).
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:59:31 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Economic Knowledge
343
could by no means describe them as “students” of the Western economists.
The same was true for Vaclav Klaus, the Czech finance minister and later
prime minister, and for his closest collaborators, Tomas Jezek and Dusan
Triska (minister of privatization and deputy finance minister, respectively),
as well as for Poland’s first finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz.
Yet, the American economists and consultants who arrived in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union after 1989 were unaware of this dialogue
and were surprised to find a consensus around neoliberalism This was
because, as we saw, the forgetting of the dialogue was produced by the
network itself and contributed to its functioning. It permitted American
economists, once again, to interpret this consensus as “data,” further proof
of the correctness and universality of their models.31 The transnational
dialogue was forgotten and observers simply perceived the diffusion of
neoliberalism from West to East. In conclusion, we would like to recount
an anecdote, whose ironic conclusion casts into sharp relief all the different
aspects of the story related here about the transnational network, the
existence of a domestic constituency for neoliberalism, the translation and
alignment of interests, the built-in forgetting and misrecognition of neo-
liberalism as “Western.”
In 1989, Gorbachev sent his senior advisor to IIASA in Vienna to
request the institute’s assistance in organizing a team of American econ-
omists, preferably from Harvard, Yale, or Princeton, to serve as consult-
ants on the transition to a market society. The Russians must have ap-
proached IIASA because the institute was familiar to them as one of the
prime links in the chain of transnational ties organized around mathe-
matical economics during the Cold War period. Gorbachev’s instructions,
however, specified that the Russians were not interested in economists
who specialized in the study of socialist economies, but rather in those
who were experts on the workings of market economies. By a curious
stroke of fate, the American economists who eventually teamed up with
Gorbachev’s men were all from Yale. The Russians were in a hurry and
Princeton and Harvard were still in session. The Yale economists were
not strident free-market advocates. They included some former advisors
to Democratic administrations who had supported state intervention in
the economy. These economists were not knowledgeable about socialist
economies or the Russian economy, and they treated the Russians econ-
omists’ papers and reports as “data,” “on the ground” information.
31 Wedel (2001) interviewed East European and Russian economists working in min-
istries, who reported spending most of their time providing information to foreign
experts, because these experts did not know much about the domestic situation. Foreign
experts then wrote proposals, based on the “data,” which ministry economists found
useless because they restated what they already knew.
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The Yale economists worked in tandem with a group of Gorbachev’s
advisers, composed of Russian economists like Anatoly Chubais, E. Yasin,
G. A. Yavlinsky, and Peter O. Aven. Virtually all of these individuals
were previously involved in the struggles over reforms and economic
jurisdiction, and by 1989 had evolved into the type of radical reformers
described above. The Yale economists report that they were “surprised”
not to have any big disagreements with the Russians at their meetings.
One American economist had arrived prepared “to do battle,” but found
the meetings to be “a love fest.”32
There was, nonetheless, some disagreement. As in many other East
European countries in transition, the main question was whether to trans-
form the economy swiftly through “shock therapy,” or whether to opt for
a more gradual approach. In one of those beautiful moments of historical
irony, the American economists argued for gradualism, while most of the
Russian reformers called for shock therapy.33 The Russians’ preference
for “shock therapy” was justified in terms of the Austrian translation
strategy: the socialist system was composed of “distorted” markets, prices
were not conveying reliable information to economic actors, and state
ownership was a form of monopoly that led to vested interests and rent
seeking. Moreover, this system was “all of a piece,” with its “own internal
consistency” (Schneider 1990, p. 41). The system was in deep crisis, not
least because previous reforms were inconsistent, contradictory, and never
complete. This meant, therefore, that a much more thorough reform was
required, in particular the complete removal of the state from economic
life. And this must be done from above, preferably without consulting
the public, because it was going to be “painful” and ordinary citizens
could not be trusted to support market reforms. They were shaped by
the socialist system into “administrative men” rather than “economic men”
and would support “populist” policies. For all these reasons, there was
no other way but to opt for “emergency measures” and “shock therapy”
(Yasin 1990, pp. 20–21). The Russians explained to their stunned Amer-
ican colleagues that they too should be interested in these lessons, which
were derived from the reform experience, because “such problems of the
transition as debureaucratization and decentralization of management are
of universal significance. Therefore, Eastern Europe may, to some degree,
turn out to be ‘proving grounds’ for identifying feasible solutions” (Aven
32 Confidential interview conducted April 24, 2001, with an American economist who
participated in the IIASA meetings.
33 Nordhaus (1990), e.g., argued against shock therapy: “In my opinion, such an ap-
proach is too risky for as large, closed, and hierarchical an economy as the Soviet
Union. As an economist, I simply could not guarantee that such an abrupt transition
would not lead to a major breakdown of the economy” (p. 148).
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et al. 1990, p. 7). In short, shock therapy was not only recommended in
order to save Eastern economies, but also to serve as a laboratory ex-
periment supporting Western economic theories.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we sought to elucidate the causes for the rapid and enthu-
siastic embrace of neoliberal economic policies in Eastern Europe after
the fall of Communism. Unlike the many accounts that attribute neoli-
beralism’s success to international pressure, blind imitation, or the need
for legitimacy, we argued that it was due to an existing transnational
network and dialogue. Following Latour, we suggested that the drafting
of postcommunist transition blueprints, even with the participation of
American economists, should not be analyzed as the diffusion of an in-
novation from West to East, but as translation meant to align the interests
of Western and East European economists and reinforce their transna-
tional ties. Within this transnational network it was impossible to assign
the role of active authors to American economists and passive recipients
to East European economists. In this case at least, neoliberalism was not
a preexisting theory or ideology that was disseminated from West to East,
but was itself synonymous with the network that connected American
and East European economists and with the translation strategy that
coordinated their interests.
We have suggested that new institutionalist sociologists would do well
to pay attention not only to processes of diffusion, but also to how insti-
tutional forms are reproduced, and, we suggest, following Latour, that
this case allows us to think of institutional forms as actor-networks. Our
understanding of the operation of the actor-network allowed us to perceive
dialogue and alignment of interests, where others saw only imitation and
imposition. We began with the socialist calculation debate and showed
that it constituted a central discursive event in the history of neoliberalism
by making socialism into a laboratory for economic knowledge. We also
showed that Austrian and mathematical economists developed two dif-
ferent translation strategies in order to connect results obtained in the
laboratory to debates about market economics. We then documented an
extensive Cold War dialogue between American and East European econ-
omists, on the basis of these translation strategies, which permitted them
to align their interests and use their network allies to fight their own
professional and political battles at home. Finally, we documented the
importance of these ties and translation strategies even in what was per-
ceived as the triumph of Western neoliberalism, that is, the design of
transition blueprints in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism.
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While we emphasized the hybrid origins of neoliberalism, we also an-
alyzed the power relations intrinsic to transnational actor-networks in
order to explain why neoliberal policies appeared to most observers to
have originated with and been imposed by American economists. We
showed that the network itself as part of its regular functioning produced
this appearance. American economists occupied an obligatory point of
passage within the network, which allowed them to mobilize the discourse
of their interlocutors and present it as “data.” Thus, the interests of net-
work participants were aligned by a translation strategy, which cast po-
stcommunist reform as a crucial laboratory experiment validating Western
economic theories.
We hope that this modest demonstration could be extended in the future
into a more general investigation of the origins of neoliberalism and the
causes for its global success. Up until now, the few attempts to provide
such an account focused on the larger macroeconomic or political context,
such as the economic crises of the 1970s, stagflation and oil price shocks,
the rise of global financial markets, and the victories of conservative
political forces (Kelly 1997; Harvey 1989). These events were seen as either
providing the definitive proof that Keynesianism was incorrect or as sim-
ply implementing the interests of large multinational capital. We hope
that our article provokes a more nuanced investigation, one that follows
the networks constructed by economists, policy makers, and business
firms, rather than too quickly extrapolates to larger causes. Why would
such nuance be important? Are we just quibbling about theoretical niceties
while the big picture is one of globalization-cum-Americanization? We do
not think so. If one is convinced that the global spread of neoliberalism
is simply the result of a monologue propounded by U.S. economists and
policymakers to the rest of the globe, one is making one’s task too easy.
One is tempted to believe that there is an easy answer and an easy target
for resistance: attack the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Federal
Reserve; cultivate the local against the global; denounce abstract, uni-
versalizing discourse formulated from the point of view of the mighty.
According to this view, if we could only get rid of these centers and let
those on the periphery determine their own fate, then we could avert the
dangers of neoliberalism . But if the analysis we presented here is correct,
the task of resisting neoliberalism is much more difficult. By no means
would the periphery provide a stable point outside the networks that
constitute neoliberalism, from which to analyze and resist it.
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Table A1 lists the Hungarian economists who participated in Ford Foun-
dation exchanges from 1964 to 1969. This is an incomplete list based on





József Bognár . . . . . . . Director, Afro-Asian Research Group (1965) and cultural
exchange program
András Bródy . . . . . . . Mathematical economist, Economic Science Institute
György Péter . . . . . . . . Director, Central Statistical Office
József Sebestyen . . . . Mathematical agricultural economist
Júlia Zala . . . . . . . . . . . Official in the Central Statistical Office
1965–66:
Lajos Ács . . . . . . . . . . . Head, Department for Economic Research at the Hungarian
National Bank.
Gyula Bora . . . . . . . . . Economic geographer, Economics University
János Hoos . . . . . . . . . . Mathematical economist, National Planning Office; instructor,
Economics University
Béla Krekó . . . . . . . . . . Mathematical economist; instructor, Economics University; di-
rector, Economic University Computer Center
József Nyilas . . . . . . . . Instructor in international economics, Economics University
György Ranki . . . . . . . Economic historian
Ann Simon . . . . . . . . . . Planning and mathematical economist, Central Statistical
Office
1966–67:
Iván Berend . . . . . . . . Economic historian and later head, Economics University
Béla Mártos . . . . . . . . . Mathematical economist, Economic Science Institute
Tibor Palánkai . . . . . . Instructor of international economics, Economics University
1967–68:
Béla Kádá . . . . . . . . . . . Economist, Afro-Asian Research Group (later, Institute on the
World Economy)
György Kondor . . . . . Mathematical economist, Economic Science Institute
András Raba . . . . . . . . International economist at the Cycles and Market Research
Institute
György Varga . . . . . . . Editor, Figyelö (economic weekly); member, National Commit-
tee for Management
1968–69:
Miklós Márton . . . . . . Economic journalist, Népszabadság; editor, Gazdaság
Tibor Nagy . . . . . . . . . Financial law professor, ELTE
András Nyilas . . . . . . Department head, Economic Science Institute.
Ferenc Rabar . . . . . . . Director, Laboratory for Information Processing (management
science group)
Note.—All institutions mentioned in table A1 are located in Budapest.
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Komárek, Martin. 1994–95. GEN - 100 Cechu Dneška. Prague: Fischer.
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Marton Tardos. London: Routledge.
Lange, Oskar. 1938. “On the Economic Theory of Socialism.” Pp. 55–143 in On the
Economic Theory of Socialism, edited by Benjamin E. Lippincott. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
———. 1967. “The Computer and the Market.” Pp. 158–61 in Socialism, Capitalism
and Economic Growth: Essays Presented to Maurice Dobb, edited by C. H. Feinstein.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Latour, Bruno. 1987. Science in Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
———. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Lavoie, Don. 1985a. National Economic Planning: What Is Left? Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger.
———. 1985b. Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate
Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leontief, Wassily. 1963. “The Decline and Rise of Soviet Economic Science.” Pp. 91–101
in Capitalism, Market Socialist, and Central Planning, edited by Wayne A. Leeman.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Leontief, Wassily, et al. 1977. The Future of the World Economy: A United Nations
Study. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lindbeck, Assar. 1971. The Political Economy of the New Left: An Outsider’s View.
New York: Harper & Row.
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:59:31 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Economic Knowledge
351
Lipton, David, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1990. “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern
Europe: The Case of Poland.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:75–133.
Mankiw, Gregory N. 1990. “A Quick Refresher Course in Macroeconomics.” Journal
of Economic Literature 28 (December): 1645–60.
Markoff, Jonathan, and Veronica Montecinos. 1993. “The Ubiquitous Rise of
Economists.” Journal of Public Policy 13:37–68.
Meyer, John W., John Boli, G. M. Thomas, and F. O. Ramirez. 1997. “World Society
and the Nation-State.” American Journal of Sociology 103:144–87.
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1991. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” Pp. 41–62 in The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Mises, Ludwig von. (1920) 1935. “Economic Calculation in the Socialist
Commonwealth.” Pp. 87–130 in Collectivist Economic Planning, edited by F. A. von
Hayek. London: George Routledge & Sons.
Morgan, Mary S. 1990. The History of Economic Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Morgan, Mary S., and Malcolm Rutherford. 1998. “American Economics: The
Character of the Transformation.” History of Political Economy 30 (suppl.): 1–29.
Murrell, Peter. 1995. “The Transition According to Cambridge, Mass.” Journal of
Economic Literature 33:164–78.
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 1992. Globalization as Hybridization. The Hague:
Publications Office, Institute of Social Studies.
Nordhaus, W. D. 1990. “Comments on the Paper by K. Kagalovsky and A.
Khandruyev.” Pp. 145–55 in Economic Reform and Integration, Proceedings of 1–3
March 1990 Meeting, edited by P. O. Aven, S. S. Shatalin, and F. Schmidt-Bleek.
Laxenburg: IIASA.
Pithart, Petr. 1989–90. “Social and Economic Developments in Czechoslovakia in the
1980s, pt. 1.” East European Reporter 4 (1): 42–45.
Portes, Richard. 1983. “Central Planning and Monetarism: Fellow Travelers?” Pp.
149–65 in Marxism, Central Planning, and the Soviet Economy: Economic Essays
in Honor of Alexander Erlich, edited by Padma Desai. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Poundstone, William. 1993. Prisoners’ Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory,
and the Puzzle of the Bomb. New York: Anchor Books.
Powell, Walter W., and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. 1991. The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Prybyla, Jan S. 1969. Preface to Comparative Economic Systems. New York: Meredith
Corporation.
Raynor, Gregory Kenneth. 2000. Engineering Social Reform: The Rise of the Ford
Foundation and Cold War Liberalism, 1908–1959. Ph.D. dissertation. New York
University, Department of History.
Reich, Robert. 1991. The Work of Nations. New York: Vintage Books.
Richmond, Yale. 1987. U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958–1986: Who Wins?
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Richta, Radovan, et al. 1969. Civilization at the Crossroads. Prague: International Arts
and Sciences Press.
Robin, Ron. 2001. The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the
Military-Intellectual Complex. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Schneider, C. M. 1990. “Summary of Discussions.” Pp. 41–46 in Economic Reform and
Integration, Proceedings of 1–3 March 1990 Meeting, edited by P. O. Aven, S. S.
Shatalin, and F. Schmidt-Bleek. Laxenburg: IIASA.
Shearmur, Jeremy. 1996. Hayek and After: Hayekian Liberalism as a Research Program.
London: Routledge.
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:59:31 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
352
Shore, Marci. 1998. “Engineering in the Age of Innocence: A Genealogy of Discourse
inside the Czechoslovak Writer’s Union, 1949–67.” Eastern European Politics and
Societies 12 (3): 397–441.
Sik, Ota. 1972. Czechoslovakia: The Bureaucratic Economy. White Plains, N.Y.: IAS
Press.
Stigler, George J. 1988. Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist. New York: Basic Books.
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